




One main goal of epistemology is to define knowledge. Legend has 
it that the ‘traditional’ or ‘standard’ view of knowledge is justified 
true belief (K=JTB) and that this traditional view reigned supreme 
for decades, centuries even. As one leading epistemology textbook 
puts it,
It is reasonable to say [that] some version or other of the tra­
ditional conception of knowledge was taken for granted . . . 
by virtually all philosophers seriously concerned with know­
ledge  in  the  period  from  the  time  of  Descartes  until  the 
middle of the twentieth century. (BonJour 2001: 43)
But that all changed in 1963 when an unheralded young philo­
sopher at Wayne State University in Detroit, Edmund Gettier, pub­
lished a paper as short as it has been influential: ‘Is Justified True 
Belief  Knowledge?’.  Gettier’s  paper  has  since  engendered  a  half­
century worth of responses. If you added up the number of times 
that this article has been discussed or cited in the literature (thou­
* This is the penultimate version of a paper forthcoming in  Epistemology:  
The Key Thinkers (Continuum), ed. Stephen Hetherington. Please cite the 
final, published version if possible.
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sands of times), and divided that by the number of words in the art­
icle  (approximately  930),  the  resulting  quotient  would  be  larger 
than the quotient for any other work of philosophy ever published. 
Now if we call this the ‘citation per word formula’ for calculating a 
publication’s influence, then it’s safe to say that Gettier’s article is 
the greatest philosophical caper of all time.
2. Gettier cases and their structure
Chapter 10 of this volume already introduced us to Gettier’s discus­
sion. But let’s expand on what was said there.
Gettier presented two cases that he thought were clear counter­
examples to the JTB theory. In particular, Gettier contended that 
his cases showed that having a justified true belief was insufficient 
for knowledge, from which it follows trivially that K≠JTB. A case of 
this sort is called a Gettier case. The Gettier problem is the problem 
of identifying why the subject in a Gettier case lacks knowledge. It is 
widely assumed that unless we solve the Gettier problem, we’ll be 
unable to adequately define knowledge. Interestingly, Gettier wasn’t  
the first to come up with what we now call Gettier cases. According 
to Bimal Matilal (1986: 135–7), the classical Indian philosopher Sri­
harsa constructed similar examples in the 1100s to confound his op­
ponents, and Roderick Chisholm (1989) reminds us that Bertrand 
Russell and Alexius Meinong also constructed such cases decades 
earlier than Gettier.  But still  it  is customary to call  them ‘Gettier 
cases’.
3  |  John Turri
Gettier cases are easy  to construct,  once you get  the feel  for 
them. Here are two prototypical examples (not Gettier’s originals).
(LAMB) One of Dr. Lamb’s students, Linus, tells her that he 
owns a Lamborghini. Linus has the title in hand. Dr. Lamb 
saw Linus arrive on campus in the  Lamborghini  each day 
this  week.  Linus even gave Dr.  Lamb the keys and let  her 
take it for a drive. Dr. Lamb believes that Linus owns a Lam­
borghini, and as a result concludes, ‘At least one of my stu­
dents owns a  Lamborghini.’  As it  turns out,  Linus doesn’t 
own a Lamborghini. He’s borrowing it from his cousin, who 
happens to have the same name and birthday. Dr. Lamb has 
no evidence of any of this deception, though. And yet it’s still 
true that at least one of her students owns a Lamborghini: a 
modest young woman who sits in the back row owns one. 
She doesn’t like to boast, though, so she doesn’t call attention 
to the fact that she owns a Lamborghini. (Vaguely modeled 
after Lehrer 1965: 169–70)
Most  philosophers who consider this  case say that  (a)  Dr.  Lamb 
does  not know  that  at  least  one  of  her  students  owns  a  Lam­
borghini, even though (b) she has a justified true belief that at least 
one of her students owns a Lamborghini.
(SHEEP) Shep is trekking through a pasture. He gazes down 
across the field and notices an animal.  Viewing conditions 
are optimal. It appears to be an unremarkable sheep, so he 
believes,  ‘That’s  a sheep in this  field,’  from which he con­
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cludes, ‘There’s at least one sheep in this field.’ As it turns 
out, Shep isn’t looking at a sheep, but rather a dog dressed 
up to look just like a sheep — a very cleverly disguised dog! 
Shep has no evidence of this deception. The thought that it 
was a disguised dog never even occurs to him. And yet it’s 
still true that there is a sheep in the field. It’s directly behind 
the dog, hidden from Shep’s view. (Adapted from Chisholm 
1989: 93)
Most philosophers who consider this case say that (a) Shep does not 
know that there is a sheep in the field, even though (b) he has a jus­
tified true belief that there is a sheep in the field.
Gettier  claimed  that  the  success  of  these  cases  as  counter­
examples to the JTB theory depends on two principles. First, that 
justification isn’t factive. This means that it’s possible to have a false  
justified belief. Second, that justification is closed under deductive 
entailment.  This  means that  if  you’re  justified in believing some 
proposition P, and P entails some other proposition Q, and you de­
duce Q from P, and believe Q based on that deduction, then you’re 
justified in believing Q too.
In light of these two points, here is one way to understand the 
‘recipe’ for generating Gettier cases (Feldman 2003: 28). Begin with 
a justified false belief that P (which is possible, if justification isn’t 
factive). Then have the protagonist deduce a true consequence, Q, 
of the justified belief that P, and have the protagonist believe Q on 
the basis of this deduction (surely this is possible). The resulting be­
lief  in Q will  be  justified (by the  assumption that  justification is 
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closed under deductive entailment). And the overall result will be a 
justified true belief that Q, without knowledge that Q.
Here is another way of understanding the Gettier recipe (Zag­
zebski 1996). Start with a belief sufficiently justified to meet the jus­
tification requirement for knowledge.  Then add an element of bad 
luck  that  would normally  prevent  the  justified belief  from being 
true. Lastly add a dose of good luck that ‘cancels out the bad,’ so the 
belief ends up true anyhow. The justification of the justified true be­
lief appears oddly disconnected from the truth, and the overall res­
ult will be a justified true belief, one which doesn’t amount to know­
ledge.
3. Some proposed solutions to the Gettier problem
Attempted solutions  to  the  Gettier  problem are legion.  Some re­
sponses are conservative,  in that they hew closely to the original 
JTB theory, introducing as little change as possible to handle the 
cases. Some responses are radical, in that they break decisively with 
the spirit of the JTB account, either dramatically refashioning the 
justification requirement, or even eliminating it  entirely. Here I’ll 
review some of the most influential and interesting responses to the 
Gettier problem (see Shope 1983 and Hetherington 2009 for detail 
on other approaches).
Some philosophers looked at Gettier cases and thought that the 
problem amounts to this: the subject has a justified true belief, but 
the belief is essentially based on a false premise. In LAMB the false 
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premise  is  Dr.  Lamb’s  belief,  ‘My  student  Linus  owns  a  Lam­
borghini,’ and in SHEEP it is Shep’s belief, ‘This animal in the field 
is a sheep’ (where ‘this’ refers to the cleverly disguised dog). This 
suggests the  no essential false basis theory of knowledge: (NFB) 
You know that P just in case (i) P is true, (ii) you believe that P, (iii)  
your belief that P is justified, and (iv) your belief that P isn’t essen­
tially based on any falsehood. (For examples of this idea, see Har­
man 1973 and Clark 1963).
One problem with NFB is that it can’t handle simple variants of 
Gettier cases. Consider this variant of LAMB.
(LUCKY LAMB): The case is the same as LAMB, except that 
unbeknownst to Linus he has just inherited a Lamborghini. 
His cousin died and left it to him.
In  this  case  Dr.  Lamb’s  belief  ‘My  student  Linus  owns  a  Lam­
borghini’  is true, so NFB can’t  handle LUCKY LAMB, because in 
this case it’s true that Linus owns the Lamborghini in question. An­
other problem with NFB is that it appears to give the wrong verdict 
in cases like this:
(BLUE DRESS)  Bill  awaits  Monica’s  arrival.  He  wonders 
whether she’ll wear a scarlet dress. He hears a step on the 
staircase and swings around to see Monica enter the room. 
‘What  a  dazzling  indigo  dress!’  he  thinks,  and  concludes, 
‘Monica’s dress isn’t scarlet.’ And he’s right: her dress isn’t 
scarlet. But it isn’t indigo either. It’s ultramarine.
Intuitively Bill knows that Monica’s dress isn’t scarlet. But his belief 
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is based on the falsehood that her dress is indigo, so NFB rules that 
he doesn’t know that Monica’s dress isn’t scarlet. (For examples of 
this line of thought, see Warfield 2005, Saunders and Champawat 
1964).
Other philosophers looked at Gettier cases and thought that the 
problem is this: the subject has a justified true belief, but the justi­
fication  is  defeated  (see,  for  example,  Lehrer  and  Paxson  1969, 
Klein 1976). In LAMB Dr. Lamb’s justification is defeated by the 
fact that Linus is deceiving her (or, in LUCKY LAMB, that LINUS is 
trying hard to deceive her).  In SHEEP Shep’s  justification is  de­
feated by the fact that he’s being deceived by a cleverly disguised 
dog.  This  suggests  the  simple defeasibility  theory of  knowledge: 
(SDT) you know that P just in case (i) P is true, (ii) you believe that 
P, (iii) your belief that P is justified, and (iv) your justification for 
believing P is undefeated. Some fact F defeats your justification for 
believing P just in case (i) you believe P based on evidence E, (ii) E 
justifies belief in P, but (iii) the combination (E+F)  fails to justify 
belief in P. In LAMB the defeater is the fact that Linus is deceiving 
Dr.  Lamb about  owning a Lamborghini  (or,  in LUCKY LAMB, is 
earnestly trying to deceive Dr. Lamb). In SHEEP the defeater is the 
fact that Shep is looking at a cleverly disguised dog.
One problem with SDT is that it seems to rule out too much. 
Consider:
(INSANE) You were just tenured! Excitedly you phone to tell 
your  best  friend  Sophia  the  wonderful  news.  Naturally 
Sophia  believes  and  congratulates  you.  However,  unbe­
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knownst to either of you, your dean just went insane — suc­
cumbed  to  the  pressures  of  profit­driven  university  gov­
ernance — and is absolutely certain you were not tenured.
It is a fact that your dean is absolutely certain that you were not ten­
ured, and that fact combined with your testimony fails to support 
Sophia’s belief that you were tenured, technically defeating her jus­
tification. Thus SDT rules that Sophia doesn’t. But intuitively she 
does know.
In response it has been suggested that knowledge is ultimately 
undefeated justified true belief. Call this the modified defeasibility 
theory: (MDT) you know that P just in case (i) P is true, (ii) you be­
lieve P based on evidence E, (iii) E justifies belief in P, and (iv) E is 
ultimately undefeated. E is ultimately undefeated just in case there 
is no fact F such that (E+F) fails to justify belief in P; or if there is 
such a fact, then there is some further fact F* such that (E+F+F*) 
does justify belief in P.1 In such a case F* is a defeater defeater. In 
INSANE, F* is the fact that your dean’s conviction is borne of insan­
ity. The main problem with MDT, however, is that the very device it 
introduces to give the intuitively correct verdict in INSANITY also 
deprives it of the ability to handle the original Gettier cases. Con­
sider LAMB. The fact that Linus is deceiving Dr. Lamb is a defeater 
(=F). But the fact that the modest female student does own a Lam­
borghini is a defeater defeater (=F*). This last fact is a defeater de­
1 This is an oversimplification, since there might be defeaters for a defeater 
defeater. But still, the point is clear enough: whenever justification is de­
feated (or a defeater defeater is defeated) there’s always at least one other 
fact to defeat the defeater (or to defeat the defeater defeater).
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feater because this combination:
E: My  student  Linus  has  possession  of  this  Lamborghini, 
drives it  frequently,  and has a title  to  the Lamborghini 
with his name and birthdate on it.
F: My student Linus does not own this Lamborghini.
F*:That young female student of mine owns a Lamborghini.
justifies Dr. Lamb’s belief that at least one of her students owns a 
Lamborghini. It does this because F* obviously entails that at least 
one of her students owns a Lamborghini. And it would do so, no 
matter how many of Dr. Lamb’s other students don’t own a Lam­
borghini.
The responses we’ve looked at so far have been conservative. 
They respond to Gettier cases by adding a fourth condition to the 
three conditions featured in the traditional JTB account. But there 
were more radical responses. Some philosophers looked at Gettier 
cases and thought that the problem amounts to this: the fact that P 
doesn’t  cause  the  subject  to  believe  that  P  (Goldman  1967).  In 
LAMB  it’s  a  fact  that  one  of  Dr.  Lamb’s  students  owns  a  Lam­
borghini, but it isn’t this fact (namely, the fact that the female stu­
dent owns one) that causes Dr. Lamb to believe that one of her stu­
dents owns a Lamborghini. In SHEEP it’s a fact that there is a sheep  
in the field, but it isn’t this fact that causes Shep to believe it. This 
observation led to the causal theory of knowledge: (CTK) you know 
that P just in case (i) P is true, (ii) you believe that P, and (iii) the 
fact that P is true causes you to believe that P. CTK gives up on jus­
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tification entirely as a condition on knowledge. The problem with 
CTK is that it is easy to introduce deviant causal chains into the de­
scription of any Gettier case, which would make it true that the rel­
evant fact causes the subject to believe that P. For example, suppose 
that we add the following background to SHEEP. A clever farmer 
dressed up the cleverly disguised dog to fool Shep. The farmer was 
caused to do this, oddly enough, by the fact that there is at least one 
sheep in the field as Shep treks by. So the fact that there is at least 
one sheep in this field (=P) caused the farmer to dress up the dog, 
which caused Shep to believe that there is at least one sheep in this 
field.  So the fact that P caused Shep to believe that P. CTK thus 
rules that Shep knows that P. But intuitively this is the wrong ver­
dict.
Another  problem with CTK is that if  we impose a  causal  re­
quirement on knowledge, then it becomes difficult to avoid skep­
tical consequences for beliefs about abstract matters, such as math­
ematical and logical truths, because it isn’t clear that, say, the fact 
that 2+2=4 can cause anything. It also becomes difficult to explain 
how we know things about the future, because it doesn’t seem pos­
sible for future facts to cause our beliefs now. Strategies for over­
coming these problems have been proposed, but not to the satisfac­
tion of many.
A  descendant  of  CTK  is  reliabilism  about  justification  and 
knowledge.2 Rather than give up entirely on justification as a condi­
2 Both reliabilism and the CTK were discussed also in Chapter 10 of this 
volume.
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tion on knowledge, some argued that we can understand justified 
belief as belief produced by a reliable cognitive process (Goldman 
1979), and then understand knowledge as roughly justified true be­
lief, where ‘justification’ is given the relevant reliabilist reading. The 
result is process reliabilism: (PR) you know that P just in case (i) P 
is true, (ii) you believe that P, and (iii) your belief that P is produced 
by  a  reliable  cognitive  process  (i.e.  your  belief  is  ‘justified’).  PR 
might handle Gettier cases by pointing out that in LAMB, for ex­
ample, Dr. Lamb’s belief is produced by making deductions based 
on the testimony of someone who is trying to deceive her, which 
plausibly isn’t a reliable process. And in SHEEP Shep’s belief is pro­
duced by making deductions based on mistaken appearances, which 
plausibly isn’t reliable either.
The main criticism of PR is that it has no principled way of in­
dividuating cognitive processes, and so no principled way of decid­
ing whether any given true belief amounts to knowledge (Conee and 
Feldman 1998). For example, why say that Shep is basing his de­
ductions on misleading appearances, rather than on perceptual ex­
perience? Perceptual  experience is reliable. But then why doesn’t 
Shep know? Another problem with PR is that it can’t handle simple 
variants of Gettier cases. Consider this variant of SHEEP.
(SPECIAL DOG) The case is the same as SHEEP, except that 
the disguised dog is very special. It tracks Shep and appears 
to him  only when at least one sheep is nearby. It wouldn’t 
appear to him unless there were a nearby sheep. It also pre­
vents  him from encountering  any  other  non­sheep  sheep­
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lookalike that would mislead him into concluding that there 
is at least one sheep nearby.
In SPECIAL DOG the following method seems perfectly reliable for 
Shep: from the fact that something looks like a sheep nearby, con­
clude that there is at least one sheep nearby. So PR rules that in 
SPECIAL DOG Shep knows that there is at least one sheep nearby. 
But it would be very surprising if Shep knew in SPECIAL DOG but 
not in SHEEP.
Other philosophers looked at Gettier cases and thought that the 
problem is this: it’s just an accident that the subject’s belief is true 
(e.g.  Unger  1968).  In  LAMB  it’s  just  an  accident  that  Dr.  Lamb 
ended up being right that at least one of her students owned a Lam­
borghini. And in SHEEP it’s just an accident that Shep ended up be­
ing right that there’s at least one sheep in the field. This suggests 
the  no­accident theory of knowledge: (NAT) you know that P just 
in case (i) P is true, (ii) you believe that P, and (iii) it is not at all an 
accident that your belief that P is true. NAT omits justification from 
its definition of knowledge, which leaves open the possibility that 
there  can be  ‘unreasonable’  knowledge,  that is,  knowledge which 
the subject is unjustified in believing is true (Unger 1968: 164). For 
example, if an epistemic guardian angel watched over you and en­
sured that your every wish came true, then wishful thinking would 
be a way for you to gain knowledge, since it would be no accident 
that your wishful beliefs turned out to be true. Many judge this to be 
an absurd consequence of the view  — surely believing something 
because you want it to be true isn’t a way of gaining knowledge! An­
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other potential problem with NAT is that it’s very difficult to explain 
what clause (iii) amounts to.
A related family of views propose a  safety condition on know­
ledge (Sosa 1999, Pritchard 2005), which is intended to give con­
tent to the idea that knowledge can’t be “accidental” or “lucky.” The 
most conservative version of a safety­based view simply appends a 
safety condition to the traditional analysis, yielding the  safe justi­
fied true belief theory of knowledge: (SJTB) you know that P just in 
case (i) P is true, (ii) you believe that P, (iii) your belief that P is jus­
tified, and (iv) your belief that P is safe. A true belief is safe just in 
case it wouldn’t easily have been false. What does it mean to say 
that a true belief ‘wouldn’t easily have been false’? There’s no pre­
cise way to define this, but the intuitive idea is that something sig­
nificant would have had to change in order to have made the belief 
false. One problem with this view is that it fails to handle simple 
variants of Gettier cases, such as SPECIAL DOG, because the Get­
tiered belief is not only justified and true, but also safe. To see why, 
recall  that  in  SPECIAL  DOG  the  cleverly  disguised  special  dog 
wouldn’t appear to Shep unless there were a nearby sheep, and also 
prevents  Shep  from  encountering  any  other  non­sheep  sheep­
lookalike that would mislead him into concluding that there is at 
least one sheep nearby. In effect, the special dog acts as a sort of 
epistemic guardian angel for Shep on such matters, which ensures 
that his beliefs about nearby sheep are not only true but also safely 
formed.
Another  family  of  views  proposes  a  sensitivity  condition on 
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knowledge (Dretske 1970, 2005, Nozick 1981). A conservative sens­
itivity­based view might  simply append a sensitivity condition to 
the  JTB analysis,  but  sensitivity theorists  typically  dispense with 
justification altogether. Your belief that P is sensitive just in case 
the following conditional is true: if P were false, then you wouldn’t 
believe that P. A sensitivity condition on knowledge handles stand­
ard Gettier cases. In LAMB if it were false that at least one of the 
students owned a Lamborghini, then Dr. Lamb would still believe 
that at  least one student did (because Linus would still  have de­
ceived her). In SHEEP if it were false that there was at least one 
sheep in the field, then Shep would still believe that there was (be­
cause the cleverly disguised dog would still have tricked him). One 
problem facing this diagnosis is that it can’t handle simple variants 
of the cases. For example, it can’t handle SPECIAL DOG because 
the  special  cleverly  disguised  dog  wouldn’t  have  tricked  Shep  if 
there were no sheep nearby; and the special cleverly disguised dog 
would prevent anything else from tricking Shep; so if there weren’t 
a nearby sheep, Shep wouldn’t believe that there was one. Another 
serious problem facing this view is that it implies that knowledge 
isn’t closed under some trivial, known deductive entailments. (We’ll 
soon return to closure and how counterintuitive it can be to deny it, 
in the next paragraph and again in section 3 below. See also Vogel 
1990 and Hawthorne 2005 for a defense of closure.)
Related  to  the  sensitivity­based  account  of  knowledge,  Fred 
Dretske (2005) has also argued for a sensitivity­based account of 
reasons or justification. On this view, justification isn’t closed under 
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deductive  entailment,  and  even  fails  to  transmit  across  some 
simple, known deductive entailments. Generally speaking, a justi­
fication to believe P is an indication that P is true. Indications carry 
information. Information comes from sources. Consider a thermo­
meter, which is a source of information. The thermometer indicates 
the ambient temperature in the room. Its readout provides a reason 
for believing that it is twenty­one degrees in here. The readout car­
ries information about the ambient temperature, in this case that it 
is twenty­one degrees. ‘That it is twenty­one degrees’ entails ‘that it 
is  not  eighteen  degrees  being  misrepresented  as  twenty­one  de­
grees’. But the latter claim is not part of the readout’s content — it 
doesn’t carry that information. And yet the readout’s content entails 
it. So your reason for believing that it’s twenty­one degrees needn’t 
also  be  a  reason  for  you  to  believe  the  obvious  deductive  con­
sequences  of  the  claim that  it’s  twenty­one degrees.  It  might  be 
easier to grasp how potentially counterintuitive this is by consider­
ing the matter more schematically. According to Dretske, the fol­
lowing is possible: reason R justifies you in believing P, and you 
know that the truth of P guarantees the truth of Q, but still, R does 
not justify you in believing Q. If Dretske is right about this, then one 
of the key assumptions of Gettier’s original discussion  — namely, 
that justification is closed under deductive entailment — is thrown 
into doubt.3
3 The denial of closure has significant implications for epistemology, beyond 
the Gettier problem. It would also enable a direct and powerful response to 
many influential skeptical arguments. In fact, this is precisely how the idea 
of denying closure entered the contemporary discussion. See Dretske 1970, 
Nozick 1981, and also Pritchard 2008 for a helpful overview.
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A more recent approach to the Gettier problem is to argue that 
knowledge can be defined as true belief for which the subject earns 
credit for  believing  the  truth,  but  a  Gettier  subject  doesn’t  earn 
credit for believing the truth, which explains why she doesn’t know 
(e.g. Greco 2003, Zagzebski 2009). For example, in SHEEP Shep 
doesn’t earn credit for believing the truth about whether there’s a 
sheep in the field. Rather, we would credit a confluence of odd cir­
cumstances for the fact that Shep ends up believing correctly. It’s an 
open question whether the operative notion of credit can ultimately 
sustain this treatment of the Gettier problem. A related view defines 
knowledge as follows: you know that P just in case you have a true 
belief that P  because you believed competently; however, it is ar­
gued,  although the  Gettier  subject  has  a  true  belief  and  believes 
competently, he doesn’t have a true belief because he believes com­
petently, which explains why he doesn’t know (Sosa 2007). Another 
related view defines knowledge as follows: you know that P just in 
case the fact that you have a true belief that P is a manifestation of 
your cognitive powers; however, it is argued, although the Gettier 
subject has a true belief and exercises her cognitive powers, the fact 
that  she  has  a  true  belief  isn’t  a  manifestation  of  her  cognitive 
powers, which explains why she doesn’t  know (Turri  2011, forth­
coming). The jury is still out on this family of approaches.
Some have argued that Gettier’s intuition about his cases was 
wrong: Gettier cases are cases of knowledge. Stephen Hetherington 
(1998, 1999, 2011) argues that a Gettier subject knows despite com­
ing perilously close to not knowing, and supplements this by dia­
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gnosing intuitions to the contrary. Whereas safety theorists would 
claim that the unsafety of a Gettier subject’s belief disqualifies it as 
a case of knowledge, Hetherington contends that its unsafety mis­
leads us into thinking that the Gettier subject doesn’t know.  The 
Gettier  subject’s  belief  might very easily have been false,  and we 
mistake  this  near  failure for  an  actual  failure.  Gettier  subjects 
straddle the divide between just barely knowing and not knowing. 
Although ingenious, Hetherington’s view remains a minority posi­
tion (Lycan 2006, Turri forthcoming).
Many philosophers have taken Gettier cases to show that justi­
fied true belief isn’t sufficient for knowledge, even though it still is 
necessary. And as we’ve already seen, some have tried to replace 
justification with something else entirely,  such as an appropriate 
casual relation, a safety condition, or a sensitivity condition. But at 
least  one philosopher  has  argued  that  they’re  all  wrong because 
knowledge is simpler than any of them had imagined: knowledge is 
mere true belief (Sartwell 1991, 1992). Crispin Sartwell’s argument 
for this position is simple: knowledge is the goal of inquiry; the goal 
of inquiry is true belief; so knowledge is true belief. Inquiry just is 
the procedure of generating beliefs about particular propositions, 
and when we ask whether some claim is true, what we want is to 
know whether it’s true. In other words, knowledge is the goal of in­
quiry. But most philosophers will object that we also want our true 
beliefs to be  justified, well supported by evidence, so Sartwell has 
left out an important aspect of our goal. Sartwell accepts that we 
want justified beliefs, but argues that this is only because justifica­
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tion is a good sign that we’ve got what we really want, namely, true 
belief. Justification is instrumentally good because it’s a good sign 
that we do know, but isn’t an essential part of knowledge.
4. The  Scylla  and Charybdis  of  post­Gettier  epistemo­
logy: Or, teetering between fallibilism and skepticism
Nearly  all  epistemologists  think that  Sartwell  is  wrong,  and that 
knowledge requires something more than true belief. Most epistem­
ologists  still  think  that  justification  is  a  necessary  condition  on 
knowledge, even if justified true belief isn’t sufficient for knowledge. 
And most epistemologists still agree with Gettier that justification 
isn’t factive (Sutton 2007 dissents). Having a justified belief that P 
doesn’t guarantee that P is true: you could be justified in believing P 
even though P is false.  Moreover,  it  is  widely held that the min­
imum level of justification required for knowledge is also non­fact­
ive:  having  knowledge­grade  justification  for  believing  that  P 
doesn’t guarantee that P is true. To put it differently, the conven­
tional  wisdom  in  contemporary  epistemology  is  that  know­
ledge­grade justification is fallible: you could be wrong even though 
you have it.
But  fallibilism has  struck many as  deeply  problematic.  What 
follows is one way of explaining why fallibilism can seem both at­
tractive and deeply puzzling (BonJour 2001).
Suppose you have a true belief. In order for it to be knowledge, 
how much justification must be added to it? Think of justification 
for a belief as measured by  how probable the belief is  given the 
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reasons or evidence you have. We can measure probability any way 
we like, but one convenient way to measure it is to use the decimals 
in the interval [0, 1] on the number line. A probability of 0 means 
that the claim is guaranteed to be false. A probability of 1 means 
that the claim is guaranteed to be true. A probability of .5 means 
that the claim is just as likely to be true as it is to be false. The ques­
tion then becomes:  how probable, relative to your evidence, must 
your belief be for it to be knowledge?
Obviously it must be greater than .5  — after all, if it were less 
than .5, then it would be more probable that your belief was false, 
given your evidence! But how much greater than .5? Suppose we say 
that knowledge requires a probability of 1 — that is, knowledge re­
quires justification that guarantees the truth of the belief. Call this 
infallible  justification.  The  infallibilist  conception  of  knowledge 
says that knowledge requires infallible justification. We can motiv­
ate the infallibilist conception as follows. If the aim of belief is truth, 
then it makes sense that knowledge would require infallible justific­
ation, because it guarantees that belief’s aim is achieved. Clearly it’s 
a good thing to have such a guarantee.
But all is not well with the infallibilist conception. It seems to 
entail that we know nothing at all about the material world outside 
of our own minds, or about the (contingent) future, or about the 
(contingent) past. For it seems that we could have had the same jus­
tification that we do in fact have, even if the world around us (or the 
past,  or the future) had been radically different. Our justification 
doesn’t guarantee that a material world exists. (Think of Descartes’s 
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evil genius.) Neither does it guarantee that there is a past or future. 
This dramatic skeptical  consequence conflicts with commonsense 
and counts against the infallibilist conception of knowledge. This is 
presumably part of the motivation for the widespread agreement 
that justification isn’t factive.
We seem compelled to conclude that knowledge requires justi­
fication that makes the belief very likely true, but needn’t guarantee 
it.  This is  the  fallibilist conception of  knowledge.  But a question 
about this view immediately arises: what level of justification does it 
require? Any point short of 1 would seem arbitrary. Why should we 
pick that point exactly? The same could be said for a vague range 
that includes  points  short of  1  — why,  exactly,  should the vague 
range  extend  that far but  not  further?  This  might  not  seem  so 
troubling in itself, but as Laurence BonJour (2001) points out, it 
suggests an even deeper problem for the weak conception. It brings 
into doubt the value of knowledge. Can knowledge really be valu­
able if it is arbitrarily defined? It would count heavily against the 
fallibilist  conception  of  knowledge  if  it  implied  that  knowledge 
wasn’t valuable.  (Kaplan 1985 raises related worries about know­
ledge’s value in light of the Gettier problem.)
A related  problem for  the  fallibilist  conception of  knowledge 
presents itself, which relates to the second of Gettier’s assumptions. 
Suppose for the sake of argument that we settle on .9 as the re­
quired level of probability. Suppose further that you believe Q and 
you  believe  R,  that  Q  and  R  are  both  true,  and  that  you  have 
reached the .9 threshold for each. Thus the fallibilist conception en­
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tails that you know Q, and it entails that you know R. Intuitively, if 
you know Q and you also know R, then you know the conjunction 
(Q&R), just by simple deduction. But, surprisingly, the weak con­
ception of knowledge can’t sustain this judgment! To see why, con­
sider  that  the  probability  of  the  conjunction  of  two independent 
claims, such as Q and R, equals  the product of their probabilities. 
(This  is  the  special  conjunction rule from probability  theory.)  In 
this case, the probability of Q = .9 and the probability of R = .9. So 
the probability of the conjunction (Q&R) = .9 × .9 = .81, which falls 
short of the required .9. So the weak conception of knowledge along 
with a law of probability entail that you don’t know the conjunction 
(Q&R),  because you aren’t  well  enough justified in  believing  the 
conjunction. Can we tolerate this result?
So we are faced with a choice between two views, fallibilism and 
infallibilism,  each  of  which  has  seemingly  unpalatable  con­
sequences.  If  we  accept  fallibilism,  then  we  seem poised  to  sur­
render  the  intuitive  claim  that  (knowledge­grade)  justification  is 
closed under simple, known deductive entailments, and also the in­
tuitive claim that knowledge is valuable. And if we accept infallibil­
ism, then we seem poised to surrender the intuitive claim that we’re 
in a position to know lots of things about the material world, the 
past and the future.
Notice how Gettier’s two assumptions relate to these unpalat­
able consequences. In setting up his problem, Gettier assumed that 
(1) justification isn’t factive and (2) justification is closed under de­
ductive entailment.  Infallibilism threatens to falsify  something in 
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the ballpark of (1), whereas fallibilism threatens to falsify something 
in the ballpark of (2). Gettier’s lasting legacy might well be to force 
us to choose between these two claims.  Are we forced to choose 
between them, or can we find some way to have our epistemological 
cake and eat it too?4
4 For helpful feedback, I thank Stephen Hetherington and Angelo Turri.
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